Wednesday, November 13, 2013

How do you know?

(A Basic Introduction to Practical Epistemology)


Relationships are made and broken, careers built or destroyed, and lives are saved or lost, based on beliefs, on what we think we know.

But how do you know what you know? Do you really know it? What does it mean to know something as opposed to merely thinking, feeling or believing it? These and related topics are explored in an area of philosophy called epistemology.

Epistemology is a relatively new word that means the study of knowledge. Studying how we come to know things and what this means may sound silly, kind of like studying why circles are round, how one can know that 2 + 2 = 4, or whether the chicken or egg came first, but it is an issue lurking about in the depths of many disagreements.

Insofar as our actions are conscious and deliberate, and sometimes even when they are not, both they and our communications spring from and express our beliefs. These can be the source of camaraderie or annoyance depending on the degree to which they correspond to and affirm or conflict with the beliefs of those around us.

If we think of a belief as a kind of thing, itself, we perceive that it has many aspects: Among other things, it has a subject, in the sense of the person holding the belief; it has an object, which is the thing in which we believe; it has degree of subjectivity or objectivity; it has a level of certainty; we have differing levels of understanding regarding the belief; we may have more or less justification for the belief and be more or less able to demonstrate it to others.



In this post:


  • Sources of Belief
  • Objects of Belief
  • Subjectivity and Objectivity
  • Justifications for Belief
  • Going from Belief to Knowledge (and back again)
  • Some justifications are not demonstrable
  • Agreement is not always attainable

Sources of Belief


We human beings are, among other things, a bristling bundle of beliefs. Some of these we unwittingly absorbed. Some we discovered, reasoned or observed. Others are explicitly, directly taught. Many of them contradict others, and we sometimes attribute more or less certainty to them than is warranted.

Irrespective of how they came to be, these beliefs vary in terms of their object and the degree to which they are subjective. For example, there is a difference in object and subjectivity between the beliefs "black licorice tastes good," "I am happy," "it is raining," and "it is wrong to murder."

Object of Belief


Does the dog believe in the cookie? If so, then the
dog is the subject, and the cookie the object
of belief.
By "object" of belief, what is meant is the thing in question, and sometimes this is pretty clear. If I assert, "my dog is as smart as a bag of hammers," the object in question is my dog (or, more precisely, my dog's intelligence or lack thereof). If I assert "George Washington never existed," then the object in question is George Washington's existence.

But other times, the actual object isn't so clear, or could do with some refining. For example, the assertion regarding black licorice really isn't so much about licorice itself as much as how it tastes to me, whereas the assertion regarding the weather is one regarding the external world, something that should be true for anyone (at least anyone who is in the immediate vicinity).

Subjectivity and Objectivity


Subjectivity and objectivity are fancy words that refer to the degree to which the belief is rooted in one's own personal perspective as opposed to the reality of an external object. A highly subjective belief is one that can vary from person to person, because it is rooted in them -- they are (or something within them is), in a sense, the object of belief. Consequently I can say "black licorice is yucky," and you can say, "you are nuts, because black licorice is the bomb," and we can both be right. This is because the object of belief is not really black licorice (and we are speaking imprecisely), but our own preference for it. In this case, we are referring to something that is more what we might call a personal taste or preference.

But some beliefs are more objective, especially those which have as their object something external to us, or that is common to all people (or should be, at least in theory). For example, the assertion that the Pacific Ocean is the largest ocean, or that it is immoral to kill an innocent person, are beliefs that could be argued as objective.

There are two small caveats here. One is that all beliefs are, by their very nature personal and, to a degree, subjective insofar as they represent our beliefs and experiences, even if these are of an external thing. For in interacting with people and objects, they cease to be purely external but, in a way, become a part of and internal to us. This doesn't mean that we can believe whatever we want about them and be equally correct, but is merely an acknowledgement that even "objective" beliefs are never really purely objective.

Second, I used the word "personal" to refer a kind of belief. Some beliefs are much more personal than others, and yet still have a kind of objectivity in the sense that they have to do with a person or thing that is not us. More on this, later.

Back to Belief


(Yes, I know, this wasn't listed in the index at the top. Consider it a free bonus, like a cookie.)

Before proceeding, the reader may have noticed that there is one word, one pivotal concept, that is being used over and over here without really being defined. That is some sloppy philosophizing! That is the word belief and the concept or reality it represents.

Like many words, this has multiple, related meanings and these can be a cause for confusion. It could refer to a particular belief like the belief that chickens lay eggs, or it might refer to the dynamic of being a thing that believes (i.e., being a creature of belief vs. having particular beliefs). It can also be used in the sense of trusting someone as in "I believe in him."

It is difficult to define precisely what belief is without using the word, itself, or a synonym. And in defining it, it is very easy to do so in a way that is either too narrow or too loose. We could say, in keeping with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, that belief is a psychological (or intellectual) state in or by which a person holds a conjecture or premise to be true. Or, alternatively, that it is a kind of attitude towards certain propositions by which we take them to be the case or true. These definitions appear to refer to particular beliefs, but the definitions seem too narrow, for in truth we have many beliefs of which we are not directly aware. Am I in a particular psychological or intellectual state regarding a premise if I'm not even aware of it? Perhaps so. Perhaps not. It could be argued. (Some might distinguish these unwitting beliefs as predispositions or the like.)

Let it suffice to say that a belief is our attitude toward some proposition or concept. Insofar as we hold it to correspond to reality, it is a belief. We may have more or less evidence or justification for this belief. It may be more subjective, more objective, and/or more or less personal. And it may be something of which we are aware, or something of which we are unaware. Whatever its object or our consciousness thereof, belief is something intrinsic and natural to the human person. We also have belief or are creatures that believe in the sense having the quality by which we hold particular beliefs.

Curiously, it seems that belief is a uniquely-human trait. That is, it does not appear to be a characteristic shared by animals, plants, etc. Nor is it present in anything that we create. It is something rooted in and inseparable our natures as rational beings. Our actions and communications all appear, at some level, to involve, manifest, transmit and revolve around belief.

This has been a long read thus far. Time for a short break:



Okay, ready to continue?

Certainty and Belief


We have differing levels of certainty or confidence about our diverse beliefs. Ideally, this level of certainty is proportional to the amount or kind of evidence or justification we have for the belief. This varies depending on the kind of belief. For example, the evidence justifying my confidence in my wife's love for me is different from the evidence justifying my belief in the existence of the Pacific Ocean, which is different from the evidence justifying my belief in the Atlantic Ocean (even though they are very similar things). I experience and participate in my wife's love, though it is immaterial, and I've been in the Pacific Ocean -- I've personally seen and touched it. Though I've never seen the Atlantic Ocean with my own eyes, I have seen pictures, and many people claim to have seen it; I have no reason to doubt their testimony.

Different kinds of truths and beliefs depend on different kinds of evidence or experience as justification. Like my belief in the Atlantic Ocean, sometimes our belief depends simply on the preponderance of voices (or authorities) that claim something to be true. Sometimes it is a personal experience or witness. Sometimes it is empirical evidence.

Sometimes the degree of certainty we have about a belief isn't rational, isn't justified. This can go both ways. On one hand, I might express certainty about something with which I have no direct experience and really can't be demonstrated or justified (e.g., whether there is life beyond our planet, or what will happen on a future date and time). And some people feel very strongly about things -- often moral, political or religious ones -- which are demonstrably false, but they believe they are justified on the basis of the strength of their feelings. On the other hand, error can include doubt or skepticism about things that actually are justified or at least worthy of consideration. For example, if I refused to believe in the Atlantic Ocean simply because I'd never seen or set foot in it, or if I refused to believe that a well documented historical person actually existed, it might demonstrate an irrational level of skepticism.

We generally need to exercise some prudence regarding certainty of topics for which we do not have any direct validation, and beware denying demonstrable beliefs simply because they may be inconvenient (in the sense of conflicting with our life-choices or other beliefs) or make us uncomfortable. And this leads to the difference between knowledge and belief.

Knowledge and Belief


Knowledge isn't simply a belief about which we are more confident, but a belief for which we have a higher degree of justification. Neither sincerity nor passion make knowledge. For example, suppose that $50 goes missing from the cash register at work. Three people had access to it: Joe, Sally and Mark. Given your experience with each of them, you might develop a feeling or belief about who might have taken the money, and you might even feel certain that one of them took the money. But you could really only say you knew who took the money if some kind of evidence or justification presented itself (e.g., one who never had any cash suddenly had an extra $50, you personally saw one of them take the money, or one of them voluntarily admitted to it).

Ideally, this justification that moves us from belief to knowledge would be something that we can demonstrate to others, but that is not always the case for (at least) two reasons. First, some kinds of beliefs, though as true as any others, are highly (inter)personal and experiential. Such things are very powerful for those who experience them, but can be difficult to demonstrate or justify for others.

Second, different people require different levels or kinds of justification before they will acknowledge something as knowledge, and until that threshold is reached, anything you say is going to be dismissed as merely an opinion. There isn't a little light that goes off when the "right" amount of justification has been provided, (and if there were, you can be assured that it would have a different threshold for each person). The decision to call something knowledge instead of merely a belief is more analog than digital; it is more of a sliding scale with values ranging from "absolutely not, no way" to "I'd bet my life on it." Precisely where on that scale something goes from being a belief to being knowledge is not clear.

Different people have different levels of understanding regarding particular things, as well. What might seem like sufficient demonstration to render nearly certain knowledge for one person might be incomprehensible to someone else, or massive overkill for another. Of course, none of this changes whether something is true -- only whether someone is capable of recognizing it as anything more than a personal opinion. That is, things are true or untrue, real or no, irrespective of our beliefs. What is important is that we do what we can to have our beliefs genuinely correspond to reality insofar as we are able; this ability varies from person to person.

Understanding and Belief


It is rational to believe in those things that we understand, and to feel more confident about that belief in proportion to our sense of understanding. However, some people then extend this idea to mean that we should not believe in things which we do not understand. This is an error. Among the various qualities of humanity is the fact that we are finite and limited in (apparently) every way, including our understanding. In fact, I'm not sure that there is anything we could confidently claim to understand completely, comprehensively. No, in our interactions with ourselves and the universe what we find constantly present is a degree of mystery, by which I mean something that we understand in part, but not fully.

What this means for belief is that, if we are honest with ourselves, we must admit not only do we not understand things fully, but sometimes it seems we hardly understand them at all. However, that does not mean that the object of belief is not true or does not exist. It merely means that we don't understand it and, perhaps we may never do so. For, in truth, we hardly understand ourselves. Understanding implies a kind of mastery. Certainly we understand some things about ourselves and the world better than we did 100 or 1000 years ago, but that doesn't change the reality that we don't understand things completely... and it is possible that we never will have complete understanding any more than we will have complete mastery.

Justification and Demonstration


There are three kinds of things that help us (legitimately) go from mere opinion/belief to knowledge:

  • Direct personal experience (including material evidence)
  • Testimony of trusted others (competent authorities)
  • Deductive or inductive reasoning

Each of these has its own strengths and weaknesses, but we lack the complete human experience if we reject any of them. What we often find in some kinds of disputes is a complete rejection of one class of justification. The remainder of this post will explore some recent disputes and how these classes came into play or were otherwise excluded.

(Any empiricist, positivist or similar -- you know who you are -- who is reading this might be alarmed by the way I have categorized the means by which we justify or demonstrate beliefs, because I did not explicitly list facts or evidence. The reason for this is that such things always come to us via one or two of the avenues listed. Though evidence exists independently of us, we only learn of it -- we can only utilize it for justification of demonstration -- via direct personal experience, the testimony of others, or incorporate it into an act of the intellect.)

Now for a small break....





... aaaaand we're back.

Some truths (and falsehoods) are more apparent and glaring to some people than to others, depending on their understanding or experience with the object. For example, someone who has substantial experience in photography is going to be more adept at recognizing true and false statements about the art and processes of photography, whereas someone who is not familiar with that field would be less able to quickly recognize truth or error about shutter speeds, aperture, lens selection, etc. Another way of saying this is that some truths are apparent to everyone, while some are apparent to the wise.

Some people are also more or less likely to accept statements and demonstrations, depending on their personality and experiences with the object or demonstrator. Some people are naturally accepting -- perhaps too much so -- whereas others are irrationally skeptical.

The primary message here is just to recognize that not everything we apprehend as true is and not everything that seems false is false. Identifying truths is something that we do naturally, but it is also a skill which people possess to different degrees. It can be increased or decreased depending on our experience, effort and a variety of factors, and like any of our abilities (natural or not), it is subject to limitations and error.

Event 1: Jesus' Existence


There may be a great deal of controversy and disagreement about precisely who or what he was, and people argue over what he actually said and did, but I don't know any credible historian who questions whether the person, Jesus of Nazareth, actually existed. It therefore came as some surprise to me when I saw two people -- one a Christian and the other apparently an atheist of some sort -- get into an argument about this. (Yes, I probably should not have been surprised, as people will argue about practically anything.)

The atheist mocked the Christian and said that he was a fool for believing in someone who was no more real than the Tooth Fairy or the Easter Bunny. Like many Christians who run into this or similar lines of attack, he really had no direct response to the claim. He simply said to the atheist (repeatedly), "well, Jesus loves you."

Perhaps that was the best response.

I can be rather slow witted and, as such, it often takes me too long to collect my thoughts into something coherent. By the time I'd constructed something useful (I thought), the spat was over and they were gone. But it caused me to reflect on how or why we accept the existence of any historical person or event as true. Consider the position of the atheist: He has never seen Jesus. No one he knows ever has. There isn't any record of Jesus writing anything (except in the dirt). We don't have birth records. This is true not only for the atheist but is equally the case for the Christian. It is a genuine problem. More to the point, the atheist is probably unimpressed by the behavior of some Christians he's known or he finds the teachings of Christianity difficult or inconvenient (or, as is often the case, he doesn't actually understand the teaching of Christ as they come to us through the Church). In any event, it wasn't clear precisely what would have constituted sufficient evidence or demonstration for him to accept Jesus' historical existence, if anything at all.

When it comes to historical persons and events, like so much that we have never personally witnessed, we generally accept their reality on testimony of others, usually people we never knew and who are long dead, usually on the basis of documents, and often one's whose authorship or genesis are not completely clear. In this case, if we are going to be critical about it, we accept the existence of Jesus as an historical fact on the basis of what was written about him by those who claim that they personally saw him or who knew those who did. To reject the mere possibility of his existence is to reject that entire class of justification, and to do that would "unjustify" other beliefs regarding historical events and persons that have similar evidences. There is, of course, a great deal more to this, but we will stop there for the sake of this brief study with the recognition that many of the things that we believe, we believe on the testimony of others.

Event 2: Affordable Care Act


I found myself in a dispute with a stranger (online) who was arguing with an acquaintance; online debates rarely go well, and I should know better by now, but I keep on holding out hope that the interlocutor will develop reason or, at the very least, the discussion will prove illustrative for observers. John was arguing that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a morally good law in and of itself and that it would be looked back upon as one of the greatest positives in American history. He said that anyone who was Christian, especially Catholic, should agree with it as a matter of faith. I disagreed with him on a number of grounds (not the least of which was his juvenile penchant for attacking the character of anyone who held an opinion at odds with his own). I laid out my arguments roughly as follows:

  1. Those who enacted ACA pretend to have the competency to tell other people what they must buy and to penalize them if they refuse (via the federal tax system). Refusal to pay taxes can result in being financially ruined, loss of home and business, destruction of one's family, imprisonment and, if one materially resists, hospitalization or death. These are the possible consequences for someone who refuses to comply with ACA. The threat or exercise of proportionate force is justifiable to stop or prevent someone from harming innocent people. It is not justifiable in an effort to coerce someone into buying something.
  2. The ACA requires people and employers to fund services which many find morally reprehensible and directly contradictory to the moral teachings of their respective religions. John had argued that ACA was fully compatible with the Catholic faith, but I suggested that perhaps he should then wonder why so many bishops and the bishops conference, itself, oppose the way in which it requires individuals and employers to pay for services to which they object.
  3. The ACA was promoted completely fraudulently by a President and Congress that knowingly and deliberately lied about its requirements and consequences. It was then passed by a Congress that apparently didn't even read the bill, who immediately excused themselves from having to follow it, and then selectively excused their well-connected friends in like manner. Any legitimate law would at least be read by those who passed it, and apply to them as well as others.
  4. As of the time of John's assertions about how wonderful ACA was, millions of people were already losing their health insurance plans because of ACA, despite promises to the contrary. This continues to this day, with estimates running much higher.
  5. Finally, I argued that it was groundless speculation to make assertions about how it would be regarded someday in the future. None of us can really know that, and such assertions are of no merit.

In all of this I was arguing from my personal experience and research into the matter. I provided references and invited John to do the same. He didn't care (and he didn't do so). He wasn't interested in what the my own personal experience and research showed. Bringing up these points merely resulted in him calling me stupid and reiteration of his original assertions.

And this is worth taking a moment to examine: Some people are not interested in the facts and cannot be reasoned with. We need to be careful to remain between the extremes of "my mind is made up and will not be confused by the facts," and "how far do you have to open your mind before your brain falls out?" There is a balance that must be struck -- an openness to demonstration, but with a sensitivity or alertness for deception and manipulation (something which is, unfortunately, prevalent).

Event 3: Debate with an Atheist


One of the classes in my graduate philosophy work was a study of atheism. Though we did some exploration of it as an historical movement, we focused primarily on modern atheism, on the writings and presentations of people such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennett. As a personal project I took it upon myself during this class to join various discussion/debate groups and participate in some of the religious and political debates. (Worldwide, atheism and equivalent stances seem to run lower than 5%, though this varies substantially from country to country. Among natural scientists, atheistic or similar perspectives appear to run about 60%. Some studies indicate that roughly 75% or more of philosophers hold effectively atheistic views.)

As a brief aside, if you haven't encountered him already, it should be known that Richard Dawkins is, well, quite the confident fellow:

The atheist would generally assert that God does not exist, and that, "there is no way that you can prove that God exists or ever did." I would respond, "Well, of course I can. There are many perfectly valid logical arguments for God's existence going back throughout the history of philosophy all the way to Plato, if not earlier. Many incorporate the latest scientific discoveries." And I would proceed to present one or two, usually the Kalam or similar argument, as these are the simplest.

The idea that God's existence could be proven logically/rationally seemed to catch them by surprise, but the stunned silence didn't last long. "No, we are only interested in empirical evidence. You must prove his existence using science alone."

Empirical evidence (in the sense of something which can be scientifically verified) is a good thing when we can get it, but it only applies to certain kinds of truths. The problem, of course, is that you cannot demonstrate the existence of many, many things by empirical evidence alone; morals, love, historical events or persons, or basically anything that one cannot personally verify in a laboratory. So, at least this particular batch of atheists had set up a requirement for demonstration when it came to things like God that no one would require of most anything else in normal life.

My response was typically along the lines of, "science could not prove to you what I ate for breakfast yesterday. If you will only recognize those things that can be proved via the scientific method, then you've just excluded roughly 90% of human life and all of history."

As mentioned above, we really only have three kinds of evidence for our beliefs; our own personal experiences, the testimony of others, and reasoning. The atheists were quite adamant that they had no interest in expressions of my personal experiences, miraculous or not. They also had no interest in the testimony of any others, historical records, etc. I asked them what evidence they could bring to bear to support their assertion that God does not exist. Like any amateur in philosophy, they were quick to say that they couldn't and had no obligation to prove a negative -- they weren't going to attempt to prove their position (never mind that there are, in fact, many ways of proving a negative). It was all very Hume-ish and a good example of how a little bit of education can be a dangerous thing.

These discussions, once you wade through all of the fallacies, routinely ended in an smoldering impasse; they would not accept any of the evidences or demonstrations for God's existence, refused to provide any evidence to support their own positions, and would only accept an evidentiary method that, though it would be fine for scientific experimentation, would not be required or useful to demonstrate the existence of a great many real things and, by definition, is incapable of demonstrating the existence of something that is immaterial and transcendent.

We frequently relate to life through the lens of our vocations and avocations -- those areas of life for which we have passion or expertise. For some this is a particular sport, or art, or gambling, or computer logic, or science. We use these fields with which we are familiar to understand and relate to other life events. Few things have been more successful than the scientific method, and we can thank this attitude toward the natural world for most of the affluence and conveniences in today's society. However, it isn't the correct method of exploration for every kind of truth, any more than a hammer -- even a very good one -- is the correct tool for every project.

Questions to Consider


You didn't realize there would be homework, did you?


  • What is the meaning or purpose of my life? How do you know this?
  • Are all human lives equal? Why or why not?
  • What does it mean for something to be true? What are some ways that I can be certain (or at least more confident) that something is true?
  • What beliefs do I have for which I have no justification? Does this mean they are false?
  • Is it okay to have beliefs for that I cannot prove to others? Why or why not?


Final Remarks


In summary, beliefs are vital to our lives. It is important to examine our own beliefs and motivations, to do what we can to eliminate those that are false and focus on those which are true. In this, we need to beware two common errors; the (usually unwitting) accepting of beliefs that are false and have no foundation, but also the rejection of beliefs that actually are true by means of failing or refusing to acknowledge legitimate demonstrations of truth. Remember that complete understanding is not necessary for something to be true, and that some truths are difficult to justify or demonstrate, but may be nonetheless true.

In the end, as important as it is to be aware of and understand our own beliefs, and to do whatever we can to have these conform to reality, life is ultimately more than "right thought." It cannot be less -- a life that was built on a variety of wrong beliefs would be chaotic and incomprehensible -- but it isn't enough, it isn't sufficient, to merely be right. Right belief is a foundation on which to build, and it is worth the effort to make sure that this foundation is as sound as possible. In addition to this, though, we must also strive to act rightly -- to actually build upon that foundation and become virtuous people -- and to truly love and respect each other. This includes respecting other people even when their beliefs differ from our own. No matter how certain we are that we are right, when it comes to our relationships with our fellow human beings, truth should be proposed -- never imposed (whether directly or via political, legal or other processes), and never presented in a manipulative or deceptive manner.



Bibliography (Annotated)


These and other resources were relied upon in the formation of the above post.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, trans. G.R.G. Mure, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941. The foundational, authoritative resource for consideration of what it means to "know" something in Western philosophy.

Gallagher, K.T. The Philosophy of Knowledge. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986. General introduction to epistemology which introduces and covers basic problems in the field. This is a graduate level text and requires some sophistication in philosophy to grasp.

Kreeft, Peter. Socratic Logic: A Logic Text Using Socratic Method, Platonic Questions, and Aristotelian Principles, edition 3.1. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008. Covers basic logic/reasoning structures by which someone can claim to know something. This text is accessible/understandable to most undergraduates.

In addition to the above, almost any Socratic dialog (all of which are written by Plato) contains excellent examples of how to work towards truth through the "dialectic," or a back-and-forth discussion whereby different possibilities are openly examined and tested.