Problems with the Libertarian Non-Aggression Principle

In a prior post I discussed difficulties with the often-referenced "principle of self-ownership." I encouraged libertarians to avoid it as a selling point, and instead focus on the principle of non-aggression. Shortly thereafter, a thoughtful, libertarian-minded friend sent me an excerpt arguing that the non-aggression principle (NAP) has an array of problems, itself. The quote was from a brief article by a professor of philosophy from the University of San Diego, Matt Zwolinski. His text is available in its entirety here.

(Please be aware that it is not my goal in this article to defend or prove NAP. It might have problems and might, indeed, need to be rethought. What I am certain of, however, is that the arguments that Zwolinski brings to bear fail to attain his stated goal of demonstrating why persons should reject non-aggression... which strikes me as an odd goal in the first place. I have nothing against Zwolinski, have never met him, and have had no prior contact. I just find his reasoning to be surprisingly bad.)

Zwolinski begins, as is often the case, by defining his target, NAP:

"This principle [...] holds that aggression against the person or property of others is always wrong, where aggression is defined narrowly in terms of the use or threat of physical violence."

One should pay very close attention when someone takes it upon himself to independently define a person, belief or topic which he is about to attack. About 99% of the time, there will be some kind of deficiency in the definition which then becomes its downfall. This is, of course, the classic "straw man" tactic. And it is present here in a couple of modes.

First, libertarians being what they are, one will be hard pressed to find some kind of universally-accepted definition of libertarianism's underlying principle(s). What we will find is a spectrum of beliefs and understandings thereof. It is hardly difficult to pick from among that spectrum a less-robust articulation, and then smash it to tiny little bits. This is easily done even in much more defined, monolithic and complex social systems, because we can always find some group of adherents who have an incomplete, unsophisticated, or even outright erroneous understanding of the system and its principles. (To be clear, from this point forward, when I am speaking of the non-aggression principle as would be articulated by thoughtful libertarians, I'll use "NAP." If referring to the non-aggression principle as defined by Zwolinski, it will be noted as ZNAP... because that is fun.)

(This is soooooo true.)

What we should do, if we are going to be genuinely critical of any belief, system, philosophy or religion, is look to its best and most complete articulations, and avoid oversimplifications thereof (of course, this is often inconvenient to one's goals of appearing clever and useful). In this case, what Zwolinski has presented as the fundamental principle of libertarianism would, if actually put into practice, be a kind of pacifism -- a refusal to engage in physical violence against anyone, period. And though libertarianism allows for pacifism -- the choice to not engage in aggression under any circumstances -- it does not preclude force or the threat thereof in all cases.

The outspoken (and deceased) pacifist Robert LeFevre, the mother who uses a gun to protect herself and her children from a home invader, as well as the nearby militia member can all rightly describe themselves as libertarians, and all rightly claim that they are abiding by the non-aggression principle, yet they each have substantially different -- yet compatible/complementary -- beliefs with regard to the exercise of force. Specifically, what they have in common is the belief that no one should initiate violence or the threat thereof against innocent people -- people who are neither threatening nor harming anyone (LeFevre, however, extended that practice to his interactions with everyone, even people who are initiating violence, themselves). Zwolinkski actually clarifies this a little in his later arguments, referring to the initiation of force, but he only does so when it is convenient for his purposes of undermining the principle, itself.

Another straw man dimension here is the limitation to physical violence. There are other kinds of aggression and abuse that can be extremely damaging. For example, people can (and do) engage in slander and libel against each other, or other kinds of psychological abuse, any of which can lead to the victim's financial and social ruin, psychological harm, and even illness or death. While we do need to make a distinction between real or just imagined aggression and harm (as well as deliberate vs. accidental), I'm not sure why Zwolinski wants to limit the definition of NAP to only physical acts, unless it is simply to bolster his own position.

Zwolinski later implies that libertarians believe that all acts can then be morally evaluated based solely on their congruence with ZNAP. It is the supreme rule to rule them all. Again, that simply is not true on the whole, and his error is one of oversimplification and generalization (another common reasoning error). While actions that violate ZNAP (and NAP) would necessarily be rejected, this does not preclude the incorporation of other, compatible moral (and religious) systems that further prescribe or proscribe behaviors. For example, a Catholic libertarian might assert that we have a moral obligation to help the homeless and hungry, or to go to Mass on Sunday. This is not derived from NAP and is really rather orthogonal thereto (in the sense that NAP isn't directly relevant) but is compatible with it, and acts as a moral ought.

As philosophers often say, a small error at the beginning of an endeavor often turns into a large one by the end, and the same thing happens in Zwolinski's line of thought. After some connecting language, he then presents six examples that he says are independent demonstrations of the insufficiency of ZNAP. His exact words are:

"In the remainder of this essay, I want to present six reasons why libertarians should reject the [Z]NAP. None of them are original to me. Each is logically independent of the others. Taken together, I think, they make a fairly overwhelming case."

Before proceeding through a couple of his examples -- it will quickly become evident that there is no need to address all of them -- an experienced reader should already be a little uneasy. Why? It should make the reader uneasy because, in addition to the straw man "foundation," Zwolinski has basically admitted that he doesn't really have a single good argument against NAP. Rather, he has a bunch of small arguments that, "taken together" are "overwhelming." While such an approach is common in politics, rhetoric and courtrooms, it is pure nonsense in any serious philosophical inquiry (and rather surprising coming from a trained philosopher). This is like the prosecutor who doesn't actually have any evidence to convict the defendant, but he has a lot of coincidences that are individually meaningless, yet somehow add up to "overwhelming" evidence.

Why six? Why not twenty? Why not one good one? The reason is because, considered individually, none of the arguments actually work. So rather than acknowledging this, we take a bunch of brief statements that, on the surface, appear to have merit, and stack them up. When you stack a bunch of bad arguments together, you don't magically get a good argument any more than individual shovels of dung can be piled up to become a Shetland pony. You just have a pile of sh... -- I mean "bad arguments" -- capable of fooling or "overwhelming" the uninitiated. There is actually a formal phrase related this fallacy, the argumentum ad nauseum (and ad infinitum), by which the person just provides a bunch of assertions (or repeats the same one over) until you are exhausted and succumb.

Two of his arguments are particularly-illustrative. I quote them in full:

"No Prohibition of Fraud – Libertarians usually say that violence may legitimately be used to prevent either force or fraud. But according to [Z]NAP, the only legitimate use of force is to prevent or punish the initiatory use of physical violence by others. And fraud is not physical violence. If I tell you that the painting you want to buy is a genuine Renoir, and it’s not, I have not physically aggressed against you. But if you buy it, find out it’s a fake, and then send the police (or your protective agency) over to my house to get your money back, then you are aggressing against me. So not only does a prohibition on fraud not follow from the NAP, it is not even compatible with it, since the use of force to prohibit fraud itself constitutes the initiation of physical violence."

Some inquiries fail because a person overlooks important distinctions. Others fail because a person makes distinctions that either aren't real or are simply irrelevant. Both errors are usually the result of either inexperience, or having an a priori position, and only "seeing" those things -- or only seeing things in such a way -- that support the position, rather than attempting to truly discern the reality. A few of the problems in the above argument include:

• NAP is not limited to only physical harm. Only ZNAP is.
• Theft of any kind is an indirect attack upon the person insofar as one's property manifests the fruits of one's own personal efforts and/or its theft does or could cause harm. If you steal my money, it is arguably equivalent to stealing whatever I would have purchased with that money; my or my children's food, this month's rent payment, gas to get to work, etc.
• As soon as someone engages in fraud (or any similar tactic) to steal your property, he is no longer innocent. He has harmed you, and that state of harm persists until such time as your property is returned. (I will admit that this kind of sneaks a concept of justice into the discussion.)

Note, too, that in the above argument Zwolinski suddenly remembers that NAP (and ZNAP, apparently) is about the initiation of violence... when it is convenient to his argument.

Zwolinski's argument could be equally made against forcibly resisting a home invasion (thereby demonstrating its absurdity). If five men come into your home through your front door and start going through your things, taking your food, money, etc., yet they do not assault you personally, Zwolinski's position is that ZNAP proscribes physically stopping them. That is obviously nonsense with respect to NAP, but it is obscured behind his fraud scenario. 

Ultimately, recovering (or preventing the theft of) your property is not a violation of NAP, but only Zwolinski's unique definition thereof (ZNAP). 

"What About the Children??? – It’s one thing to say that aggression against others is wrong. It’s quite another to say that it’s the only thing that’s wrong – or the only wrong that is properly subject to prevention or rectification by force. But taken to its consistent extreme, as Murray Rothbard took it, the [Z]NAP implies that there is nothing wrong with allowing your three year-old son to starve to death, so long as you do not forcibly prevent him from obtaining food on his own. Or, at least, it implies that it would be wrong for others to, say, trespass on your property in order to give the child you’re deliberately starving a piece of bread. This, I think, is a fairly devastating reductio of the view that positive duties may never be coercively enforced. That it was Rothbard himself who presented the reductio, without, apparently, realizing the absurdity into which he had walked, rather boggles the mind."

The underlying reasoning here is as follows:

(1) Any act that is not an initiation or threat of physical violence is permissible (per ZNAP).

(2) Allowing one's child to starve to death is not an initiation or threat of physical violence.

Therefore, allowing one's child to starve to death is permissible (per ZNAP).

This argument is (structurally/logically) valid, but the premises have all kinds of problems. The first premise represents (or hides, rather) Zwolinski's straw man, and is, as already been explained, an erroneous oversimplification. Here is a visual representation of the argument: 

There is yet another way in which this is an oversimplification that is worth noting now, and that is that NAP is not an assertion that everything save the threat or initiation of violence is good, but that the threat or initiation of violence against innocent people is bad. This isn't to say that there aren't other bad acts. It is merely to say that the initiation or threat of violence is always, fundamentally bad -- it is among, though not identified with, bad things. This graphic demonstrates the position that most libertarians would probably articulate if thoughtfully questioned:

Suppose that someone said, "Rape is wrong. It is always wrong. It doesn't matter what the circumstances are, rape is always bad." The "Zwolinskian" response would be to say, "Your position is in error, unrealistic and unworkable. No society can be founded on the idea that rape is wrong. There are plenty of other considerations in life besides rape. What about the children? Are you saying we can do whatever we want to them, as long as we don't rape them?"

He's right. There are plenty of other considerations, but that doesn't change the fact that rape is still always wrong and never right! And saying that it is always wrong to rape people doesn't mean that rape is the only consideration one engages when deliberating about moral decisions. Likewise, asserting that there are other considerations beyond NAP doesn't change the reality that NAP may very well be a perfectly robust moral guide.

The tension really comes down to this: The non-aggression principle is not a complete moral compass for guiding every act in one's life. It is merely a fundamental principle among others. It is one of several guard rails along side the road of life, intended to keep one from going over the cliff, but it is not the only, nor is it even necessarily the highest or best rule to follow. When someone claims it is the highest or only rule, or articulates it incorrectly, problems result; this goes for proponents as well as opponents.

I agree with Zwolinski: ZNAP -- the absolute prohibition of physical violence in all circumstances -- is insufficient as an exclusive guide for living, is likely impossible to apply, is unrealistic/implausible, and should be rethought. However, that still leaves us to consider NAP.

That all being said, Zwolinski's article prompts some issues worthy of further examination. These include:

• The distinctions between imagined, possible, accidental and deliberate harm.
• The role of voluntary participation when considering social interactions and risks.
• Whether the non-aggression principle, in its most robust articulation, is vulnerable to Zwolinski's or others' criticisms.

We'll consider these in more depth in future articles.