Problems with the Libertarian Principle of Self Ownership

Summary: The principle of self-ownership is one of the two principles put forth by many as fundamental to libertarian political theory. However, it is ambiguous and insufficient as a basis for a political or moral philosophy. Libertarians, voluntaryists, anarchists and such would do better to abandon ambiguity and instead refer primarily to the principle of non-aggression.

In the interest of context, the reader should watch this persuasive video before continuing. It will take a few minutes, but it is a few minutes well spent:

The history of moral and political philosophy is, among other things, a series of assertions that individual and collective human activity is (or should be) directed with respect to a highest guiding principle, either because that is what will be "best" (whatever that means), or because that principle represents some kind of transcendent law akin to gravity. The problem, of course, is that different people each propose a different guiding principle; happiness, human flourishing, various religious precepts, common good, good will, rationality, various forms of egoism, pleasure, utility, societal approval, etc. A thorough study of these indicates that, for most part, each is correct in its own narrow way or a particular perspective, but there are difficulties. Any of these, taken exclusively, leads to choices and circumstances that seem to be wrong and that conflict with evaluations based on other, equally-justifiable principles. No single principle or maxim appears sufficient to guide all of human activity. However, each claims to be the highest principle (manifesting a problem known as incommensurability). If that is correct, then there is no higher rule by which to order or evaluate these principles, leaving any assertions regarding which is “better” than others as little more than subjective emotivism.

For (a classic) example of conflicting moral theories, one person might argue that it is justified, or actually good and moral, to grotesquely torture a terrorist who knows the location of a chemical bomb planted somewhere in a large city. The person arguing for the rightness of this action will appeal to the goodness of the lives saved, suffering avoided, etc., by bringing pain to this guilty criminal. Another might argue, however, that torture is intrinsically wrong, no matter to whom it is done or under what circumstances. He argues that the torturee might not be guilty -- he could be crazy, misidentified, or some other circumstance -- that the information collected is almost never useful, and that torture is, itself, fundamentally evil. Which of these persons is correct? Why? This is not a hypothetical or extreme problem. Our own government actively scoops up suspected "terrorists," violently tortures them, etc. It has come to light that the information collected was generally useless and, in many cases, they kidnapped, physically and psychologically destroyed (and even killed) innocent people. (A similar, but perhaps more inflammatory example can be raised with respect to abortion.)

In addition to the problems encountered when pushing a single principle as the sole highest value in all human circumstances -- such as how to choose the principle and order related principles and behaviors -- some principles have serious problems in and of themselves. Unfortunately, exuberant adherents to and proponents of such principles are frequently blind to these problems; this should not come as a surprise, as we are generally myopic when it comes to our own ideas, beliefs and values, and unaware of their weaknesses and errors until they are rigorously challenged (if even then). One such principle that is routinely espoused rather uncritically yet enthusiastically is the libertarian principle of self-ownership.

As with any such principle, it would be best to clearly define what it means from the outset. And that is where we hit our first problem: there is not a consensus or clarity on what this even means (and we are asking for something that is unlikely to happen in expecting consensus from libertarians). Specifically, precisely what is it that is owned, who or what owns it, and what does that ownership imply regarding the freedom of the owner to utilize his property?

Some define self-ownership in a narrow, restrictive way, to merely mean (in application) that no one else may act as if I am his property; what I should or should not do with my self is then subject to a variety of other moral considerations and maxims... or not. On the comprehensive, permissive end, self-ownership is taken to mean that one's body (or life) is merely an object like any other object, and that the possessor of that object can do whatever he pleases with his own property, much as he could do as he wishes with a piece of wood or a wrench. As long as the plank or wrench (or one's body) are not used to harm someone else, anything goes. But this prompts the question, "on what grounds are we adding the condition that you can do whatever you want, as long as it doesn't harm someone else?" There is also the problem of how to measure or qualify what harm is, whether it has actually happened, and so on. These may seem like esoteric or abstract questions, but they are precisely what matters if one starts trying to actually apply the self ownership principle.

One might say, "rational life or persons are not property, and therefore cannot be owned." This is a concept that could have traction. To a large degree, acts of slavery have involved a demeaning of the slave as something sub-human, merely animal. And we see that dehumanization is generally a precursor to harming a person or population. But this, too, even if correct, just takes us down an alley toward even more subtle questions:

• Why is it that only rational life is not property? Why not other living things? Why living things and not non-living things?
• Any control we have over anything, whether ourselves or external objects, is limited. fleeting and perhaps even illusory. This being the case, what does ownership really mean?

This spectrum of meaning perceived in the principle of self-ownership reflects the spectrum of persons attracted to libertarianism, ranging from atheists, skeptics, materialists and others who question nearly any moral norm, to theists who might otherwise be caricatured as very (morally) conservative or traditional, who argue that we don't so much own our lives as much as we have been entrusted with them. It also reflects a related spectrum of thought and belief with respect to anthropology and ontology (the meaning of humanity and being). In other words, despite enthusiastic cries to the contrary, the reality is that the principle of self-ownership is neither uniformly held nor understood by those who are otherwise proponents of libertarianism and similar philosophies (e.g., voluntaryism, agorism, minarchism, anarchism, etc.). These differences with respect to what is presented as a fundamental, unifying principle are highly problematic.

The problems lurking in the principle of self-ownership are related to the meaning(s) of the words own and property, as well as perspectives regarding the construction and meaning of the human person. With respect to own and property, scrutiny seems to reveal them to be mental constructs having to do with socially-acceptable human behavior. As such, there is a very real possibility that they are completely arbitrary. Specifically, when we look to the external, natural world, we do not find clear examples of ownership or property in any objective, transcendent sense. Some animals collect things, but this in no way prevents another animal from taking them. Some animals claim a territory, but the claim does not prevent any other animal from challenging that claim.

We assume that these words and the ideas they represent are realities, to the degree that people will fight to the death over the objects they describe. It isn't clear that these concepts of own and property have any meaning independent of mental constructs, and as such we are left with a fundamental problem. To resolve the matter, we must discern whether our mental construct is, in fact, purely arbitrary and fictitious, or whether, being rational, we have discerned something beyond the grasp or practice of other, less-rational creatures -- a kind of universal or transcendent law. This is not a question that is easily answered, and we should be immediately suspicious of anyone who claims otherwise, or that the answer is "self evident," or any other nonsense.

What does it mean to “own” something? Some say that it has to do with having control, but we can control things that we do not own. Some say that it has to do with possession, but we can possess things that we do not own, and own things that we do not possess. Strictly speaking, to own something seems to mean that one has the ultimate and complete authority with respect to its use (i.e., can determine who may or may not use it, how it can be used, etc., without anyone being able to require otherwise). Such authority seems to be associated with being involved in a thing's creation, or in transfer of such authority from someone who was. But, again, we seem to be discussing a social convention more than something objective.

For example, a few years ago I made a cedar strip canoe. I own it (I think), by which I mean that I can determine who may or may not use it, how it may be used, and so on. No one may rightly presume to use it in a way other than what I have authorized. Indeed, I could use it in ways completely contrary to its design, and though people might say that what I was doing was foolish, they couldn't (rightly) argue that it was “wrong” or immoral. In other words, claims regarding ownership are ultimately moral claims, and as such, open up "a whole 'nother can of worms" (and one that many libertarians don't want to mess with).

Another way of making the same relational assertions without making problematic anthropological, ontological and moral implications is to just assert that other people are not your property and should never be treated as such. This position is congruent with maxims from many philosophical movements and religions:

• People should never be treated merely as means to an end.
• Love your neighbor as yourself.
• Do unto others as you would have done to you.
• Do not do to others as you would not have done to you.
• Live and let live.

This is also congruent with the one thing that various libertarians generally hold in common: the idea that no one may rightly threaten or initiate harm – may not “aggress” – against an innocent person (and by innocent I mean precisely someone who is not initiating harm or threats against someone else). This can be derived from the principle of self-ownership. This is often stated, however, as a distinct principle – the non-aggression principle – and is justified for reasons independent from the principle of self-ownership (i.e., arguments from theism as well as normative moral philosophies like deontology, virtue-ethics and utilitarianism also frequently endorse or promote non-aggression, but on completely different bases).

Granted, the non-aggression principle is, like ownership, vulnerable to the accusation that it is nothing more than a social custom, an assertion. The difference, however, is that it is directly-related to behavior -- indeed, it specifically is a behavior-related maxim -- as opposed to a principle that one then has to unpack and apply. In this sense it appears to be fully compatible with the categorical imperative of Kant's deontology (in both the perfect and imperfect senses), as well as other major moral philosophies and religions.

There may be a problem hidden in utilitarianism, which allows for acts that would otherwise be considered to evil to be engaged in an "ends justifies the means" kind of context, but it is arguable that this is likely not due to a problem with the non-aggression principle, as much as it may be a problem with utilitarianism/consequentialism.

What does this all mean for day-to-day life?

First, we must acknowledge that libertarian political philosophy is not and does not pretend to be a complete moral philosophy. It is obviously and deliberately insufficient to such a task. Rather, it is a small set of ideas of principles that many people believe should be at the heart of our interactions with each other as a society.

With respect to the non-aggression principle, I encourage the reader, especially when in any kind of conflict with others, to ask himself whether his actions are, in fact, non-aggressive? If our actions, directly or indirectly, involve any kind of threat, demand upon or aggression against another person -- and this is frequently hidden, subtle -- then that is something to reconsider. The deeper problem here is that we are, for the most part, raised within a society where such behavior is not the exception, but the conditioned norm. As such, we don't even recognize it when we are doing it.

But perhaps that is something we can change.